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COMMITMENTS IN PHASE ONE MERGER PROCEEDINGS: THE
COMMISSION’S POWER TO ACCEPT AND ENFORCE PHASE
ONE COMMITMENTS
MORTEN P. BROBERG
1. Introduction
On 21 September 1990, the EC Merger Regulation1 entered into force.
Since then, concentrations2 with a Community dimension must be noti-
fied to the European Commission before they are put into effect. The
Regulation complements Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. However,
where the latter provisions must follow the laborious procedures laid
down in Regulation 17,3 a different set applies under the Merger Reg-
ulation, making it considerably quicker to obtain a final and binding
decision under this Regulation than under Articles 85 and 86.4
 Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen. The author is very grateful to
Adj. Professor, former President of the European Court of Justice, Ole Due of the
University of Copenhagen, Dr. Hartmut Krause LL.M. of the lawfirm Hengeler
Mueller Weitzel Wirtz, Frankfurt, and Mr Niels Fenger of the Danish Ministry of
Justice for having provided very insightful comments on a draft of this article.
Obviously, the author alone shall be held responsible for the views and fallacies
which appear in the final article.
1. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 Dec. 1989 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, O.J. 1989, L 395, Corrigendum in O.J. 1990,
L 257.
2. The Merger Regulation applies the term “concentration” which is broader than
the term “merger”.
3. Council Regulation No. 17 of 6 Feb. 1962. First Regulation implementing Arts.
85 and 86 EC amended by Regulation No. 59, by Regulation No. 118/63/EEC and
by Regulation (EEC) No. 2822/71.
4. Structural joint ventures and arrangements benefitting from the opposition pro-
cedure provided in certain block-exemptions may however obtain a quick clearance
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Under the Merger Regulation, the Commission’s examination of a
concentration case is divided into two phases. The first phase lasts up
to one month and is only of a preliminary kind. During this phase the
Commission only ascertains whether the operation comes within the
scope of the Regulation and whether it “raises serious doubts as to its
compatibility with the common market”.5 If this is so, the Commission
initiates an in-depth second phase examination, which may last up
to four months, during which it examines whether the concentration
“creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or
in a substantial part of it”.6
The Commission has the powers straightforwardly to clear or prohibit
a concentration. Moreover, Article 8(2)(2) of the Regulation also vests
in the Commission the powers to:
“attach to its decision conditions and obligations intended to ensure
that the undertakings comply with the commitments they have
entered into vis-a`-vis the Commission with a view to modifying
the original concentration plan.”
This power to attach conditions and obligations to the clearance, how-
ever, only concerns decisions issued after a second phase investigation.
Even though the Regulation does not, explicitly, provide the Commis-
sion with the powers to attach conditions and obligations to a clearance
decision issued already after a first phase examination, the Commission
under Art. 85. See the Commission’s internal guidance note for the handling of
structural joint ventures, published in (1993) CMLR, 238-240 and e.g. Commission
Regulation (EEC) No. 418/85 of 19 Dec. 1984 on the application of Art. 85(3) EC
to categories of research and development agreements and amended by Commission
Regulation (EEC) No. 151/93 of 23 Dec. 1992.
5. Art. 6(1)(c) of the Regulation. More than 90% of all merger cases end with a
first phase decision.
6. Art. 2(3). It is thus clear that the net is cast more widely under the phase one
test compared to the test in phase two.
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has in fact accepted modifications at this stage.7;8 The obvious question
is whether the Commission’s clearance of concentrations on the basis
of commitments, following only a first phase examination, is lawful?9
In this paper I will examine the pros and cons of phase one com-
mitments. However, before embarking on this analysis, a brief note is
needed on the terms “commitment”, “condition” and “obligation”. The
parties to a concentration may offer commitments to the Commission
7. See the following first phase clearances: Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland (Case
IV/M009), Decision of 8 Feb. 1991; TNT/Canada Post, DPB Postdienst, La Poste,
PTT Post, Sweden Post (Case IV/M102), Decision of 2 Dec. 1991; Courtaulds/SNIA,
(Case IV/M113), Decision of 19 Dec. 1991; Grand Metropolitan/Cinzano (Case
IV/M184), Decision of 7 Feb. 1992; IFINT/EXOR (Case IV/M187), Decision of 2
March 1992; Thomas Cook/LTU/West LB (Case IV/M229), Decision of 14 July 1992
(on this case, see Clough, EC Merger Regulation – A practical guide to the EC merger
and acquisition rules, Financial Times Management Report (London, 1994), p. 189
and Lowe, Remedies in EC Merger Cases, speech given to the EC Committee of the
American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, Hotel Europa, Brussels, 14 June 1993
at p. 7); Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol (Case IV/M235), Decision of 4 Sept. 1992;
Air France/SABENA (Case IV/M157), Decision of 5 Oct. 1992; British Airways/TAT
(Case IV/259), Decision of 27 Nov. 1992; BHF/CCF/Charterhouse (Case IV/M319),
Decision of 30 Aug. 1993; Unilever France/Ortiz Miko (II) (Case IV/M422), Decision
of 15 March 1994; Elf Atochem/Ru¨tgers (Case IV/M442), Decision of 29 July 1994;
Glaxo/Wellcome (Case IV/M555), Decision of 28 Feb. 1995; Swissair/Sabena (Case
IV/M616) Decision of 20 July 1995; Allianz/Elvia/Lloyd Adriatico (Case IV/M539),
Decision of 3 Apr. 1995 (on this case, see also Commission, XXVth Report on
Competition Policy 1995, Luxembourg 1996 at part 2,III,A,1.10), Repola/Kymene
(Case IV/M646) Decision of 30 Oct. 1995 and Bank Austria/Creditanstalt (Case
IV/M873), Decision of 11 March 1997.
8. Heidenhain, “Commitments in EC merger control”, in Hawk (Ed.), 1993 Ford-
ham Corp. L. Inst., p. 435 at p. 441 points out that first phase commitments “are
not fundamentally different in their content from those given in the Second Phase
Proceedings.”
9. These questions are not of a purely academic interest as is clear from the case
De vennootschap naar Frans recht TAT EUROPEAN AIRLINES v. De N.V. Sabena,
decision by Hof Van Beroep te Brussel, Nr.: 1996/AR/1275, Judgment of 8 Jan.
1997.; unpublished. At the time of writing it had not been decided whether the case
shall be appealed to the Supreme Court. See also Overbury and Drauz, EC Merger
Control – Annual Review (Frank Fine, ed.), Legal Studies Publishing Ltd., London
1993 at pp. 115-116 and p. 116 respectively, discussing the Commission decision Air
France/Sabena, supra note 7, the decision giving rise to the Belgian case.
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during the examination in order to have the transaction cleared. The
Commission may thereupon decide to make such a commitment either
a condition, which must be fulfilled in order for the clearance to become
valid, or an obligation the fulfilment of which does not in itself affect
the validity of the clearance decision.10 The Commission may also
decide not to attach a condition or an obligation to the commitment, for
instance because the Commission considers it too difficult to control
the compliance therewith.11
2. Discussion
2.1. Interpretation by analogy
The immediate argument in favour of first phase commitments is an
interpretation by analogy so that the Commission’s power to accept
second phase commitments is also applied in phase one.
By giving the Commission express powers to clear a concentration on
the basis of commitments (in phase two), the drafters of the legislation
have shown that they favour a flexible approach. Consequently, it would
10. Berlin, Controˆle communautaire des concentrations (Pedone, 1992) at pp.
307-310 and 314-315. See also Heidenhain, supra note 8 at pp. 437-439 and Kerse,
E.C. Antitrust Procedure, 3rd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) at pp. 217-220. In
practice it seems that the terms condition and obligation are used interchangeably;
see for instance XXIInd Report on Competition Policy 1992 at para. 9 in which it
is stated that “[t]he conditions which the Commission imposed consisted mainly of
obligations: : : ” (italics added).
11. In MSG/Media Service (Case IV/M469), Decision of 9 Nov. 1994, O.J. 1994,
L 364/1 the Commission at para 95 rejects the parties’ commitments inter alia on
the basis that their enforceability may be put into question. See also Siemens/Italtel
(Case IV/M468), Decision of 17 Feb. 1995, O.J. 1995, L 161/27, at para 62 and
Mercedes-Benz/Ka¨ssbohrer (Case IV/M477), Decision of 14 Feb. 1995, O.J. 1995,
L 211/1, at paras. 78 and 90; Nordic Satelite Distribution (Case IV/M490), Decision
of 19 July 1995, O.J. 1996, L 53/20 at paras. 156-158 and 159 and XXVth Report on
Competition Policy 1995 at para 135. As pointed out by Fuchs, “Zusagen, Auflagen
und Bedingungen in der europa¨ischen Fusionskontrolle”, (1996) WuW, 269 at 278-
279, the Commission can only take a commitment into consideration where it has
attached conditions or obligations thereto, thereby making it possible to enforce the
commitment.
Commitments in merger proceedings 849
be rather strange if the Commission should apply a rigid approach in the
first phase, but a flexible one in the second phase. It is therefore argued
that a flexible approach, along the lines provided by the drafters in
the second phase, necessarily means that the Commission must accept
commitments in phase one, by interpreting Article 8(2) by analogy.
Whilst this line of reasoning may appear persuasive, it is difficult
to find any more substantive support for it. As concerns the structure
provided by the Regulation, the legislators have not provided the nec-
essary time, the relevant legal safeguards, or the necessary enforcement
powers in phase one, thereby more than indicating that it was not their
intention to allow phase one commitments. Regarding the wording of
the Regulation, it is explicitly provided that the Commission may attach
conditions or obligations to second phase commitments12 and the Com-
mission is also explicitly given the necessary powers to enforce these.
Thus, the legislators have shown that when drafting the Regulation
they were conscious of vesting in the Commission the ability to accept
commitments.
It is clear that the arguments in favour of applying Article 8(2) by
analogy are strong, but it is equally clear that such interpretation does
not find any real support in the Regulation; in our opinion it must
therefore be dismissed.
2.2. Proportionality
A phase one examination may last up to one month, whereas a phase
two examination may last an additional four months. If, during the first
phase proceedings, the undertakings concerned offer suitable commit-
ments to remedy any competition concerns which the Commission
may have, it appears to be unduly disruptive and to entail unnecessary
administrative effort and delay for these undertakings (as well as for
the Commission) if the Commission is forced to open a four months
12. Indeed, Art. 7(4) vests in the Commission the power to derogate from the
requirement that the concentration must be suspended at least 3 weeks from the day
of notification. This derogation may be made subject to conditions and obligations
so on this specific point the Regulation allows the use of conditions and obligations
in phase one.
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second phase examination with the only objective of formally accept-
ing some commitments which it was prepared to accept already during
phase one, had it had the powers to do so.13
In other words, where a concentration creates or strengthens a dom-
inant position whereby effective competition is significantly impeded
in the common market, it will be disproportionate to open a time-
consuming second phase examination if the commitments offered by
the undertakings concerned could remedy the problem already during
the first phase. Accordingly, the question is not whether the Commis-
sion possesses the power to accept commitments in phase one, but
rather whether the Commission is obliged to accept commitments in
phase one on the basis of the principle of proportionality.14 One may
go a step further and argue that if the undertakings concerned offer first
phase commitments which, if fulfilled, will mean that the concentration
does not raise “serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common
market”,15 then the Regulation does not vest in the Commission the
power to enter a second phase examination, so it has no other choice
but to issue a first phase clearance.16
The proportionality argument hinges on whether the extra time, nec-
essary if the Commission enters a second phase examination solely
to accept some commitments, is disproportionate. Put differently, is
13. Drauz, “Remedies under the Merger Regulation”, paper given at the Fordham
Corporate Law Institute, Twenty-Third Annual Conference 1996 (not yet published)
at point III.B (p. 12). See also XXIVth Report on Competition Policy 1994, at para
315.; Drauz and Schroeder, Praxis der europa¨ischen Fusionskontrolle, 3rd ed. (Ver-
lag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 1995), at p. 204; Zachmann, Le controˆle com-
munautaire des concentrations (LGDJ, 1994), at p. 366 and Ehlermann, “Deux ans
d’application du controˆle des concentrations: bilan et perspectives”, (1993) RMC,
242 at 247-248.
14. Quaere, is the proportionality consideration only relevant vis-a`-vis the under-
takings concerned, or is it also relevant vis-a`-vis third parties and Member States so
that the Commission may not accelerate the decision process to such degree that the
latter’s rights are disproportionately affected? In this author’s view this aspect of the
proportionality argument is equally important.
15. Art. 6(1)(c).
16. Bergmann, “Settlements in EC merger control proceedings: A summary of EC
enforcement practice and a comparison with the United States”, 62 Antitrust Law
Journal, 47 at 86.
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a second phase examination, merely in order to attach conditions or
obligations to some commitments, put forward by the undertakings
concerned, to have the Commission clear the concentration, dispropor-
tionate to what is required.
On the one hand, it must first be acknowledged that speed is often
of the essence in merger cases so that the difference between only
having to go through a phase one examination (one month) rather than
having to submit to a full investigation (together with the first phase
lasting up to five months) may be very considerable. On the other
hand, before accepting the proportionality argument, one must first
ascertain that entering a second phase solely to attach conditions or
obligations to some commitments, necessarily results in a dispropor-
tionate prolongation of the examination. The legislators have imposed
certain time limits on the Commission. It must end the first phase
investigation as soon as it has established either that the operation falls
outside the scope of the Regulation or that it falls within the scope
and does/does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the
common market. This decision must be reached at the latest one month
from receipt of the notification. The second phase must be ended “as
soon as it appears that [the inacceptable parts of the concentration]
have been removed, particularly as a result of modifications made by
the undertakings concerned”17 and at the latest within four months of
the initiation of the second phase procedure.18
If a competition problem is so easily identifiable that it is possible
adequately to address it during the first phase, it is reasonable to assume
that the Commission identifies the problem early in the preliminary
examination. In contrast, if this problem is only identified in the late
stages of the first phase, it will be very difficult for the Commission
to give the possible remedies of a competition problem the thorough
consideration necessary.
Where the Commission finds that a notified operation falls within the
scope of the Regulation and “raises serious doubts as to its compatibil-
17. Art. 10(2), (emphasis added).
18. Art. 10(3).
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ity with the common market”19 a second phase examination must be
initiated. If the Commission is able to identify the competition prob-
lems within e.g. one week of the date of notification,20 it must end the
first phase examination even though the one month deadline has not
yet expired. Upon entering the second phase examination the Com-
mission must duly observe the different legal safeguards laid down in
the Regulation.21 Nevertheless, if the problems are easily identifiable
and if the parties to the concentration swiftly offer adequate commit-
ments to remedy these, the second phase examination can be finished
within a time frame which is not substantially longer than what had
been the situation if the Commission had ended the case on the basis
of commitments given during the first phase.22
The present system thus does provide the necessary flexibility for
making swift second phase clearances on the basis of commitments,
thereby eliminating the basis for the proportionality argument.
2.3. Legal safeguards
The Regulation clearly distinguishes between a preliminary first phase
and an in-depth second phase examination. During the preliminary
phase one, the Commission only examines two matters. First, whether
19. Art. 6(1)(c).
20. Under Art. 9(2) a Member State may within three weeks of the date of receipt
of a copy of a notification request that the Commission refers the case to its national
competition authority. The Commission may therefore not issue a first phase clearance
before the three week period has expired. It appears, however, that the Commission
may enter a second phase procedure without awaiting the expiration of this period,
cf. Art. 9(4)(b).
21. Of course, Member State representatives may want to use the legal safeguards
applicable in second phase proceedings thereby delaying the process somewhat. See
on this point Hawk and Huser, European Community Merger Control: A Practitioner’s
Guide (Kluwer Law International, 1996) at pp. 309 and 326.
22. Moreover, as shown infra at 2.3. with note 35, the Commission has submitted
a proposal to the Council according to which first phase examinations, which also
cover commitments, may last up to 6 weeks. If this proposal is successful, the time
difference between a first phase decision covering commitments and a second phase
decision, as the one described here, may vanish.
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the operation falls within the scope of the Regulation, and second
whether the operation gives rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility
with the common market. If the answers to these two questions are
affirmative, the Commission must open an in-depth examination.
Allocating the substantive appraisal to phase two and making phase
one of a purely preliminary kind means that the large majority of legal
safeguards have only been included in phase two. Hence, a decision
following a second phase examination must be taken by the full college
of Commissioners whereas a first phase decision may be taken by
the Commissioner for competition together with the President of the
Commission.23 The legislators thus intended the less straightforward
cases to be decided by the full college of Commissioners, and thereby
instituted a system of checks and balances.24
A number of other legal safeguards exist. Regarding both first phase
and second phase proceedings, the Commission is required to carry out
its investigations in “close and constant liason” with the national com-
petition authorities.25 However, only during second phase examinations
is it mandatory to hear the special Advisory Committee, made up of
representatives of the Member States, before reaching a final decision.26
23. Cook and Kerse, E.C. Merger Control (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), p. 191 with
footnote 12 assume that in Air France/Sabena, supra note 7 the French and Bel-
gian companies relied “on the collective good sense of the French President of the
Commission and the Belgian Competition Commissioner.”
24. Brown, “Judicial review of Commission decisions under the Merger Regula-
tion: The first cases”, (1994) ECLR, 296-305 at 305 writes that “the most important
check in practice on the quality of the MTF’s [the Merger Task Force of the Com-
mission] analysis in most cases is the threat that the 17 Commissioners will not
endorse the MTF’s draft decision.” At the same time, however, he also notes that the
Commissioners cannot be immune from political considerations. In the case Mannes-
mann/Vallourec/Ilva (Case IV/M315), Decision of 31 Jan. 1994, O.J. 1994, L 102, p.
15, the college of Commissioners overturned the proposal for a decision submitted
by the Commission services. See also Cook and Kerse, op. cit. supra note 23 at p.
196.
25. Recital 20 and Art. 19(2) of the Regulation.
26. See Art. 19(3)-(7). In Mercedes Benz/Ka¨ssbohrer, supra note 11, the MTF
apparently proposed a clearance decision that was voted down by the Advisory
Committee causing the Commission to redraft the decision, cf. Hawk and Huser, op.
cit. supra note 21 at p. 315.
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The Regulation likewise only requires the publication of second phase
decisions in the Official Journal of the European Communities.27 The
Commission and the national competition authorities may also hear
third parties during the investigation where these have shown a suf-
ficient interest in the case.28 The Regulation only provides the latter
safeguard regarding second phase examinations.29
The undertakings concerned only make phase one commitments
where they believe that the Commission will otherwise find that the
concentration gives rise to serious doubts as to compatibility with the
common market. Under the system set up by the legislators, the “seri-
ous doubts” cases were intended to be examined in phase two, meaning
that all the safeguards provided in this phase would also apply to the
commitments offered by the undertakings concerned. Accepting com-
mitments in phase one necessarily means that the phase two safeguards
do not apply.30 The Commission is aware of this problem and has
attempted to remedy it by allowing third parties and Member States
27. Art. 20(1). The Commission, at its own initiative, has decided to make all first
phase decisions accessible to the public.
28. Art. 18(4).
29. This is clear from reading Art. 18(1) and (4) in conjunction, see likewise, Cook
and Kerse, op. cit. supra note 23 at p. 114. Nevertheless, apparently the CFI in Case
T-3/93, Air France v. Commission (DAN AIR), [1994] ECR II-121, at para 81 did
not distinguish between the first and the second phase regarding the application of
Art. 18(4): cf. Toth in his case note in 32 CML Rev., 271 at 286. It is nonetheless
established practice for the Commission to offer Member State authorities and third
parties the opportunity of commenting on commitments proposed in the first phase, cf.
Commission, Community Merger Control – Green Paper on the Review of the Merger
Regulation, COM(96) 19 fin., Brussels 31.1.1996, at para 123. See also Drauz, op.
cit. supra note 13 at point III.B (pp. 12-13) and XXIVth Report on Competition Policy
1994 at para 315.
30. Indeed the Commission has been under heavy criticism for using commitments
in phase two as a means of industrial engineering, making a cautious approach
to phase one commitments all the more important. See further Portwood, Mergers
under EEC Competition Law (The Athlone Pres, 1994) at pp. 138-139 and 148-
149; Livingston, Competition Law and Practice (FT Law & Tax, 1995) at p. 1013;
Clough, op. cit. supra note 7 at p. 189; Immenga, Die Europa¨ische Fusionskontrolle
im wettbewerbspolitischen Kra¨ftefeld (Mohr, 1993) at pp. 29-31 and Davies and
Lavoie, “EEC merger control – A half term report before the 1993 review?”, 16
World Competition, no. 3, 27 at 31-33. Contrast with Overbury, “Politics or policy?
Commitments in merger proceedings 855
to comment on commitments proposed in phase one proceedings. This
fine initiative has, unfortunately, run up against the problem that often
phase one does not allow the necessary time for such a hearing to make
sense.31 For instance in Repola/Kymmene32 the Commission provided
the Member States with only 24 hours to comment on the proposed
commitments, causing the British, Danish, French and German com-
petition authorities to state that under these circumstances they were
not able to put forward a final opinion.33
There can hardly be any doubt that the safeguards introduced by
the Commission in phase one are insufficient compared with those
available in phase two.34 This has, indirectly, been acknowledged by the
Commission, since in its 1996 proposal for a revision of the Regulation
it notes that
“[i]t has been considered appropriate to clarify the situation with
regard to first phase commitments : : : . [The proposal] extends the
first phase to six weeks in cases where commitments are offered
The demystification of EC merger control”, 1992 Fordham Corp. L. Inst., p. 557, at
pp. 583-585 and 587 and Lowe, op. cit. supra note 7 at pp. 6 and 11-12.
31. Within the span of only one month the Commission must first examine the case,
then receive the parties’ commitments whereupon third parties (which must first be
identified) and Member States must be heard. Finally the Commission must evaluate
the commitments in the light of the comments obtained through the hearing before
making a decision. According to Drauz and Schroeder, op. cit. supra note 13 at p.
214, consultation with Member States and hearing third parties is only possible where
the commitments are put forward within two weeks from the date of notification.
32. Supra note 7.
33. Cf. Stockmann and Schultz, Kartellrechtspraxis und Kartellrechtsprechung
1995/96 (RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, 1996), at p. 290. See also
Lo¨ffler in Langen/Bunte, Kommentar zum deutschen und europa¨ischen Kartellrecht,
7th ed. (Luchterhand, 1994) at p. 2050; Heidenhain, op. cit. supra note 8 at p. 441
and XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 1993 at para 73(i).
34. Apparently both third parties and Member States have expressed concerns
about the transparency regarding the Commission’s use of first phase commitments,
cf. Livingston, op. cit. supra note 30 at pp. 790 and 1009 and Hawk and Huser, op.
cit. supra note 21 at p. 324. See also Green, “The appraisal of an appraisal: The
compatibility of concentrations under Regulation 4064 89/EC”, in Fine (Ed.), EC
Merger Control – Annual Review (Legal Studies Publishing Ltd., 1993) at p. 80.
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by the parties, in order to allow effective consultation of Member
States and third parties : : : .”35
Moreover, according to the Commission’s proposal for a revision it will
only be possible to put forward first phase commitments during the first
three weeks (of what will be six weeks after the proposed extension) of
the first phase in order to make it possible to hear the Member States.36
One might also argue that requiring the Commission to enter a phase
two procedure is unfounded if the undertakings concerned may easily
avoid entering such procedure without materially changing the opera-
tion (including the proposed commitments) and still obtain a clearance.
This possibility is open if the undertakings concerned withdraw their
notification only to make a new notification with the necessary com-
mitments worked into the concentration plan.37 If the adapted concen-
tration plan does not give rise to serious doubts as to the compatibility
with the common market, the Commission will clear the operation
on the basis of the first phase examination. On the face of it there is
no material difference between the situation where the concentration
35. Cf. para 31 of the Communication from the Commission to the Council and to
the European Parliament regarding the revision of the Merger Regulation, COM(96)
313 fin. of 12 Sept. 1996, (emphasis added). Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 11 at 283 with
note 70, does not find this extension convincing.
36. Cf. Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European
Parliament regarding the revision of the Merger Regulation, supra note 35 at para 31
with footnote 3. It is also worth of note that the Commission has found it necessary to
require second phase commitments to be submitted at the latest one month before the
day of expiry of the second phase, cf. Art. 18 of Commission Regulation (EC) No.
3384/94 of 21 Dec. 1994 on the notifications, time limits and hearings provided for
in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings. For the background to this alteration, see Drauz, op. cit. supra note 13
at point III.A (p. 12); Hawk and Huser, op. cit. supra note 21 at p. 326 and XXIVth
Report on Competition Policy 1994 at para 236.
37. Lowe, op. cit. supra note 7 at p. 8. See for an example, Broberg, “EC merger
control”, (1996) European Management Journal, 622 at 626 and Drauz, op. cit. supra
note 13 at point III.B (p. 13). See also Drauz and Schroeder, op. cit. supra note 13, p.
214; the Commission’s Green Paper, supra note 29 at para 126 and, critical, Mu¨lbert,
“Zusagen im deutschen und europa¨ischen Fusionskontrollrecht”, (1995) Zeitschrift
fu¨r Wirtschaftsrecht, 699 at 711.
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is cleared after the undertakings have offered commitments and the
situation where these commitments have been worked into the concen-
tration plan.38 However, if the parties to the concentration fail to duly
observe the notified (and cleared) concentration plan, the Commission
may claim that the concentration actually carried out differs so much
from the cleared one that the Commission does not consider these
to be identical. Consequently the validity of any transaction putting
the actual concentration into effect is dependent on the Commission’s
clearance.39 It follows that a commitment which has been worked into
a renotified concentration plan does not present the same enforcement
problems as do commitments which are not part of the concentration
plan.40
Moreover, the argument that clearing a renotified concentration in
which the commitments have been worked into the concentration plan
is no different from clearing the concentration after having accepted
first phase commitments simply overlooks the fact that the problem for
introducing legal safeguards in phase one is the lack of time. Encourag-
ing the undertakings concerned to renotify an amended operation allows
Member States, third parties and the Commission itself more time to
evaluate the changes. Also, experience has shown that the Commis-
sion might open a phase two proceeding even where the undertakings
concerned have renotified an operation with the “commitments” imple-
mented into the concentration plan. This is a clear indication that the
extra time available in the case of a renotification makes a more careful
examination possible.41 Moreover, as noted above, working the com-
38. Apparently the Commission now favours renotification over accepting com-
mitments in the first phase, cf. Hawk and Huser, op. cit. supra note 21 at pp. 323-324
and Livingston, op. cit. supra note 30 at pp. 916 and 1009, the latter apparently
taking the view that “[t]he Commission now insists on the withdrawal of the original
notification and submission of a new notification containing modified proposals on
which public consultation can take place”. The view that the Commission “insists”
on this does not seem to find support in the Commission’s decisions.
39. Art. 7(5).
40. See also 2.5 infra concerning the distinction between amendments and
commitments.
41. Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz (Case IV/M430), Decision of 21 June 1994,
O.J. 1994, L 354/32.
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mitments into the notified concentration plan does away with doubts
as to their enforceability.
The lack of safeguards in phase one strongly supports the view that the
Commission may not clear a concentration on the basis of commitments
already at this stage.
2.4. Enforcement
2.4.1. No enforcement power?
The Regulation vests in the Commission the possibility of issuing
fines42 and of revoking a clearance decision43 where the undertakings
concerned do not duly observe an obligation attached to the decision.
These powers only concern second phase decisions, however,44 and the
question is whether powers of the Commission to accept commitments
in phase one ipso facto means that it also possesses the necessary
powers to enforce such commitments. Indeed this question seems to
have split even the Commission’s Merger Task Force.45
The Merger Regulation is intended to be part of a system ensuring
that competition in the common market is not distorted.46 If a concen-
tration is likely to cause lasting damage to competition in the common
market, the undertakings concerned may offer commitments to counter
this damage, making it possible for the Commission to clear the con-
centration. However, if the Commission is unable to enforce phase one
42. Arts. 14(2)(a) and 15(2)(a).
43. Art. 8(5).
44. For the same view, see Stockmann and Schultz, op. cit. supra note 33 at pp.
289-290. See also Hawk and Huser, op. cit. supra note 21 at p. 331; Lo¨ffler, op.
cit. supra note 33 at p. 2050; Livingston, op. cit. supra note 30 at p. 1010; Cook
and Kerse, op. cit. supra note 23 at p. 185; Bergmann, op. cit. supra note 16 at 86;
Heidenhain, op. cit. supra note 8 at p. 440; Bos et al., Concentration Control in the
European Economic Community (Graham & Trotman, 1992) at p. 262; Van Bael and
Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 3rd ed. (CCH Europe, 1994) at
p. 507 and Markert, case note to Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, EEC Merger Control
Reporter (Kluwer Law International) looseleaf, p. 872.1 at p. 872.4.
45. See Overbury and Drauz, op. cit. supra note 9 at pp. 114-117; Overbury, op.
cit. supra note 30 at p. 577 and Drauz, op. cit. supra note 13 at point III.B (p. 13).
46. Art. 3(g) EC.
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commitments, the undertakings concerned may be tempted to disre-
gard these, which in turn may cause lasting damage to competition.
Accepting commitments in phase one without being able to enforce
these will therefore run counter to the aims of the Regulation and of
the Treaty.
This problem may, however, be countered in three different ways.
These three possibilities are examined below.
2.4.2. Applying Article 8(2)(2) by analogy
The most obvious way of enforcing a phase one commitment is through
the analogous application of the powers provided in the Regulation
regarding the enforcement of phase two commitments.47 This solution
has, however, been held to be “arguably inadmissible because it would
be to the detriment of the parties to the proceeding.”48 It is true that
the Commission’s enforcement of a commitment given by the parties
is to the detriment of the latter, and it is also true that in such circum-
stances an interpretation by analogy normally presupposes particularly
persuasive arguments. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the
powers laid down in the Regulation to enforce conditions and obliga-
tions attached to second phase commitments are really incidental to the
power to attach conditions and obligations to these commitments. In
other words, it is arguable that the Commission’s power to attach con-
ditions and obligations to second phase commitments and its powers
to enforce these must be seen as being part and parcel. Consequently,
if it were accepted that the power to attach conditions and obliga-
tions to second phase commitments may be applied by analogy to first
phase commitments, it would only be logical if the incidental powers
to enforce these were to apply by analogy as well.
As is clear, the argument is absolutely dependent upon whether the
Commission may attach conditions and obligations to phase one com-
mitments by analogy to the Regulation’s explicit powers to do so in
phase two. In 2.2 above, this possibility was rejected: it follows that
applying Article 8(2)(2) by analogy must be rejected as well.
47. See e.g. Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 11 at 285.
48. Bergmann, op. cit. supra note 16 at 86.
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2.4.3. The doctrine of implied powers
The doctrine of implied powers presents the second possibility of vest-
ing in the Commission the powers to enforce first phase commitments.49
If we accept that the Commission possesses the power to accept first
phase commitments, but that the phase two enforcement powers do
not apply by analogy, then the Commission lacks the necessary pow-
er to enforce first phase commitments. It is equally obvious that if
the undertakings concerned fail to comply with a commitment which
brought the Commission to issue a phase one clearance, this does not
contribute to the securing of undistorted competition in the common
market; the central objective behind the Regulation.50 This seems to be
an obvious case for the doctrine of implied powers, empowering the
Commission to enforce the commitment, for instance by revoking the
clearance decision.
The weak point in this argument is that it presupposes that the Com-
mission has the power to accept phase one commitments, which, it was
argued above, is not the case.
2.4.4. The contract construction
The Commission’s power to clear a concentration on the basis of com-
mitments given in the second phase is clearly of a regulatory nature.
The drafters of the Merger Regulation have provided a flexible system
where the Commission may clear the concentration on the basis of
modifications made subsequently to the notification. In order to assure
that these modifications will be put into effect, the Regulation vests in
the Commission the power to enforce these.51 Perhaps as a reflection
of this regulatory nature, the Commission may not impose changes on
the concentration in return for a clearance. Instead the Commission is
restricted to pointing out the problematic points in the concentration
49. See Bourgeois, “Undertakings in E.C. competition law”, in Slot and McDonnell
(Eds.), Procedure and Enforcement in E.C. and U.S. Competition Law – Proceedings
of the Leiden Europa Instituut Seminar on User-friendly Competition Law (Sweet
& Maxwell, 1993) at pp. 97-98 and Krause, “Article 6(1)b EC Merger Regulation:
Improving the reliability of commitments”, (1994) ECLR, 209 at 211.
50. See preamble 1 of the Regulation, referring to Art. 3(f) (now Art. 3(g)) EC.
51. Art. 8(2).
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and thereupon it is solely for the parties to decide whether (and if so
which) modifications shall be made before the Commission reaches its
final decision.52
Regarding commitments made in the first phase, the situation may be
different. Whether commitments made in the first phase are contractual
or regulatory in nature depends on the Commission’s legal basis for
accepting such commitments. Where the Commission applies either
Article 8(2) of the Regulation by analogy or refers to some implied
powers (on the basis that opening a second phase proceeding would
be disproportionate) the first phase commitment will be regulatory in
nature. However, it might also be possible to apply a contract construc-
tion, borrowed from German law, to first phase commitments. In this
case the commitment will be contractual in nature. Under the contract
construction “undertakings not foreseen in the law itself, are viewed as
a type of contract between the company which volunteers the undertak-
ing and the public body”.53 In an article from 1994, Hartmut Krause has
developed this construction.54 The idea is that the undertakings con-
cerned enter into commitments, and in return the Commission promises
a first phase clearance. In order to be able to enforce this contract, an
arbitration clause, giving the European Court of Justice jurisdiction in
accordance with Article 181 EC, should be included. Krause explains
that Article 181 contains the roots for the suggested approach and that
“it is presupposed that the Community’s arsenal of legal instru-
ments contains contracts of subordination by means of which the
Commission may exercise its sovereign power instead of issuing a
unilateral administrative act.”55
52. Cf. Van Bael and Bellis, op. cit. supra note 44 at p. 507 and Drauz, op. cit.
supra note 13 at II.B (p. 3).
53. Cf. Drauz, op. cit. supra note 9 at p. 117. See also Bergmann, op. cit. supra
note 16 at 87; Livingston, op. cit. supra note 30 at p. 1010 and, more elaborate,
Krause, op. cit. supra note 49. According to Drauz and Schroeder, op. cit. supra note
13 at p. 206 the Commission has considered the idea, but it is not mentioned in the
Commission’s Green Paper, supra note 29 at paras. 122-126, so presumably it is no
longer given serious consideration.
54. Supra note 49.
55. Supra note 49 at 216.
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In essence, the enforcement of first phase commitments is then based
on Article 181.
This contractual construction differs from the regulatory ones ex-
plained earlier, both with regard to the necessary procedural powers
and with regard to the necessary substantive powers.
Hence, as concerns procedure, it is clear that the ordinary powers
of the Court of Justice do not suffice for this purpose. It is therefore
necessary (and also possible) to use Article 181 to vest in the Court of
Justice jurisdiction to hear a case on the matter.
The substantive powers present significantly larger problems than
do the procedural. Under the contract construction, there seems to
be nothing restraining the Commission from requiring the parties to
make certain specified commitments in return for the clearance. These
phase one commitments will be directly enforceable before the Court
of Justice. However, the scheme set up by the Merger Regulation does
not even allow the Commission to require the parties to make certain
commitments in return for a clearance in the second phase. The contract
construction therefore vests in the Commission powers to be applied
in the first phase, which are much more far-reaching than the powers
which the Regulation itself vests in the Commission to be applied in
the second phase. There can be no doubt that this is inconsistent with
the scheme provided by the Merger Regulation.
Moreover, whereas it is possible to find the procedural powers to
support the contract construction, it is more than difficult to find the
necessary substantive powers. The Regulation itself clearly does not
provide these powers. However, it is equally clear that Article 181
was not introduced in order to provide the Commission with certain
administrative powers in situations where these powers cannot be found
in the relevant legislation. Article 181 is not a substantive provision,
but simply a provision on jurisdiction. While the Commission may
rely on the freedom of contract regarding private contracts, a more
substantive power is required before the Commission may enter into
a public contract. No such power appears to exist. Consequently, the
contract construction based on Article 181 EC is not, it is submitted, apt
as the legal basis for accepting and enforcing first phase commitments.
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Even though the contract construction creates its own justification
for the Commission accepting phase one commitments (whereas the
possibilities examined above at 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. presuppose a separate
justification on this point) it is respectfully submitted that the construc-
tion must be rejected as inadmissible.
2.5. Distinguishing amendments and commitments
The Merger Regulation explicitly deals with commitments given in
order to obtain a clearance. However, the concentration must be notified
so early56 that frequently the undertakings concerned cannot provide
all the necessary information before the deadline, either because it
was not accessible at that time or because the operation undergoes
some amendments after notification. This was acknowledged by the
legislators when preparing the Merger Regulation, so that the phase
one deadline only starts running when the Commission has received
complete information.57
Technically speaking, an amendment may be defined as an agreement
between the undertakings concerned to change the concentration plan
as such, whereas a commitment is a promise from the undertakings to
the Commission which constitutes an addition to the concentration plan.
An amendment essentially constitutes a renotification and it follows
that only insignificant amendments may be made during phase two
(otherwise the undertakings concerned essentially have to go through
a renotification).
At first glance this distinction may appear subtle or even artificial.
Nevertheless, it carries with it some significant differences:
First, the Commission may (and often must) count the phase one
deadline from (the day following the day) when the amendment was
56. Notification must take place “not more than one week after [the first of] the
conclusion of the agreement, or the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition
of a controlling interest.” Cf. Art. 4(1).
57. See Art. 10(1) of the Merger Regulation and Art. 4(3) of Commission Reg-
ulation (EC) No. 3384/94 of 21 Dec. 1994 on the notifications, time limits and
hearings provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings.
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notified, thereby providing more time to carry out the necessary eval-
uation thereof.
Second, an amendment is part of the concentration plan. If the under-
takings concerned do not duly observe the concentration plan, but
instead carry out an operation without the amendment, the Commis-
sion may find that the actual operation differs from the one cleared
to such degree that the actual operation amounts to an unnotified
concentration.58 In such case the Commission may impose fines for
failure to notify59 and the validity of any transaction carried out as
part of an un-notified concentration is dependent upon a subsequent
clearance.60
Third, since the amendment is treated, essentially, like a renotifi-
cation, the (rather limited) phase one safeguards apply. This means
that the Commission must transmit the amended concentration plan
to the competent authorities of the Member States.61 Also, as noted
above,62 within three weeks from the receipt of notification, a Member
State may ask the Commission to refer the concentration to its national
competition authorities. This precludes a Commission clearance until
the three weeks have elapsed. It is arguable that this provision equally
applies to amendments, so that the Commission cannot issue a clear-
ance within three weeks following the Commission’s transmission of
the undertakings concerned’s amended concentration plan to the com-
petent authorities of the Member States.
Fourth, it might be that in the case of breaches of commitments and
amendments there is a difference as to who is to bear the burden of
58. See also 2.3 supra.
59. Art. 14(1).
60. The views expressed here, to a certain degree find parallels in the views
expressed by Drauz, op. cit. supra note 9 at p. 116. See also A.G. Lenz in his
Opinion of 12 Sept. 1995 in Case C-480/93, Zunis Holding v. Commission, [1996]
ECR I-1, at para 14. The case was an appeal from the CFI; see in this respect Case
T-83/92, Zunis Holding v. Commission, [1993] ECR II-1169, paras. 28 and 33. It is,
however, noteworthy that once a deal has been implemented, it is often very difficult
to unscramble, cf. Sir Leon Brittan, European Competition Policy – Keeping the
Playing-Field Level (Brassey’s and CEPS, 1992), at p. 109.
61. Art. 19(1). See also Arts. 19(2) and 18(4).
62. Note 20, referring to Art. 9(2) of the Regulation.
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proof. Thus, one may argue that it is for the undertakings concerned to
prove that they have duly fulfilled a commitment given to the Commis-
sion whereas it is for the Commission to prove that the undertakings
concerned have not duly observed the (amended) concentration plan.
Finally, not all commitments can be changed to amendments. This is
particularly the case where the commitment is made by a third party,
for instance where two air carriers join forces and the public authorities
(not the air carriers) give commitments regarding structural barriers in
the affected markets.63
One may argue that if phase one commitments are not lawful, then
replacing the present use of such commitments with amendments
amounts to circumvention. This argument is wrong however. If an
amendment is treated along the lines set out here, there is no real dif-
ference between renotifications and amendments. Hence there is no
doubt that the Commission has the power to accept amendments (and
renotifications), and neither the legal safeguards nor the Commission’s
power to enforce the amendments present problems.
The question is what value this technique has to the Commission? It
is fairly clear that phase one clearances issued on the basis of commit-
ments until now cannot be construed as clearances based on amend-
ments: While Member States (and third parties) have been notified of
the commitment the Commission has not started the phase one deadline
anew, and the clearance has been issued before the three weeks period,
provided in Article 9(2), has expired. The technique may, however,
prove timesaving. Above it is argued that the present merger control
scheme provides the necessary flexibility to issue phase two clearances
based on commitments within a short period. Nevertheless, the Com-
mission does not exploit this flexibility and it is not likely to do so either.
At least in the more straightforward cases, the amendment technique
may prove an efficient and speedy way of obtaining almost the same
benefits as provided by phase one commitments without compromising
the legal safeguards or the enforcement possibilities.
63. See e.g. Air France/Sabena, British Airways/TAT and Swissair/Sabena, supra
note 7.
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3. Conclusion
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the Commission may not
clear a concentration on the basis of commitments given in phase one.
The arguments that the Commission possesses such power either by
interpreting Article 8(2)(2) by analogy or by invoking the proportion-
ality principle are rebutted.64 In contrast the argument that such phase
one commitments may significantly prejudice the legal safeguards built
into the Regulation is found to be very convincing. As concerns the
Commission’s possibility of enforcing first phase commitments, it nec-
essarily follows from general administrative law principles that if the
Commission does possess the power to accept phase one commitments,
it must also be able to revoke a decision where the accepted commit-
ments have not been duly observed.65 The more formal justification for
such revocation may be found either in an interpretation by analogy
or simply in the implied powers doctrine. Only because it is found
that the Commission does not possess the power to accept phase one
commitments in the first place, is it concluded that the Commission
cannot enforce those phase one commitments which it has accepted,
irrespective of the fact that it lacks the power to do so. The possibility
of enforcing phase one commitments through a contract construction
based on Article 181 is also dismissed.
Two possible ways out of the maze are identified. Either the Commis-
sion may exploit more fully the flexibility built into the merger control
scheme by issuing second phase clearances, based on commitments,
much faster than is done at present, or it might use a construction based
on amendments instead of commitments.
64. In addition to the legal arguments in favour of first phase commitments, a justifi-
cation based more on psychology seems to have been important in the Commission’s
decision to accept phase one commitments, cf. Overbury, op. cit. supra note 30 at
576 and the same author op. cit. supra note 9 at p. 115.
65. Public authorities may rely on implied conditions in their decisions; in this case
the condition that the commitment is observed.
